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The Importance of Actor Cleavages in
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*The Importance of Actor Cleavages in Negotiating the European
Constitutional Treaty*

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore government preferences, cleavages, and patterns of coalition-formation among a variety of actors in the bargaining process on the European Constitution, across the range of twenty-five European Union (EU) member states. The study focuses on preferences concerning socio-economic policy-making and explores whether divisions can be discerned between preferences held by actors according to locations on the left-right policy scale, actors in older as compared to newer EU states, net EU budget positions, domestic rates of support for European integration, and smaller as compared to larger states. The analysis also controls for possible external effects, such as recent domestic macro-economic developments. Finally, the paper explores, while focusing on Article 3 of the European Constitution, which actors submitted collaborative contributions during the Convention process and whether or not they followed discernable patterns of collaborations between representatives of member states and political party groups.

Keywords: Constitution for Europe, European Convention, European public space

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1 Introduction¹

The Convention on the Future of Europe, conducted between February 28, 2002 and July 10, 2003, aimed to integrate a broad range of societal actors in Europe into discussions on the future shape of the European Union (EU). Clearly, discontent in public opinion about the path and scope of European integration alerted officials to the fact that societal actors and representatives of various groups had to be accounted for in discussions on Europe's future. The Jean Monnet method, a "top-down" approach in which European integration would be furthered without the approval of national parliaments or citizens, appeared to be no longer feasible. The Convention aimed to include a wide range of societal actors into discussions on Europe's future. During the Convention process, a total of 6474 contributions were submitted from 197 distinct speakers located in 28 different countries (Benoit et al. 2005: 292). After intensive debates among a wide range of actors on the domestic and European levels, the Convention presented a draft text for the Constitutional Treaty. The subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) revised some aspects of the text but approved a majority of its elements. In referendums at the end of May and at the beginning of June 2005, however, citizens in France and in the Netherlands rejected the project. This brought into sharp relief the gap between governmental preferences on EU integration and citizens' priorities regarding the endeavor.

This paper aims to explore which division lines can be seen among actors in discussions and negotiations on the new EU Constitution, specifically regarding socio-economic policy making. Were governments in the EU's new member states, notably those located in Central and Eastern Europe, advocating different positions than did their fellow EU states in the Western parts of the EU? The 2005 referendum outcomes indicate that dissatisfaction with the Constitution project might be particularly pronounced in the founding states of the EU (or at the time, the European Community, EC). Can differences be discerned between the EU's original member states and those that joined in the course of later enlargements? Did domestic macroeconomic conditions, such as unemployment rates, influence the contents of aspects governments aimed to have incorporated into the final treaty text? Could, in the bargaining process, divisions predominantly have occurred between the EU's larger and smaller states or between states with higher as compared to lower levels of domestic support for European integration? Another possibility is that the distribution of preferences in the EU is not homogeneous within member states, but rather follows divisions across the EU, such as those based on the left-right policy scale. If the left-right division is one of the major cleavages – possibly alongside an integra-

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the final conference of the project Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI), June 19-21, 2005 in Brussels, the 3rd General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in Budapest, September 8-10, 2005, and the 102nd Annual Meeting of the *American Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, PA, August 31 - Sept 3, 2006. We notably wish to thank Ken Benoit, Thomas Bräuninger, Alexandra Hennessy, Simon Hix, Simon Hug, Thomas König, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik, Gerald Schneider, and George Tsebelis, as well as several other conference participants and an anonymous referee, for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of this manuscript. Finally, we thank Hellena Souisa for compiling information on membership of Convention delegates in various Convention working groups.

tion-independence policy dimension – structuring discussions on European integration (e.g. Hix 1998, 1999), then it is likely that affiliation with political parties, across the range of the current twenty-five states, may have shaped bargaining on Europe's Constitution.

In order to discern whether there were division lines in the negotiation process either in a comparison between newer and older EU states, on the basis of the size or budget status of EU member states, or in a comparison between actors located at different positions on the left-right policy scale across the entire range of the EU, this paper will explore preference divisions by resorting to the analysis of three different data sets: (a) information on preferences held by a range of governmental and partisan actors regarding elements of the European Constitution as collected in the framework of the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) research project; (b) the analysis of documents as submitted by various actors in the process of the Convention on the Future of Europe; and (c) selected Eurobarometer data on public opinion in EU states. We describe some relevant data and test differences mirroring these potential cleavage lines by employing quantitative techniques: binary logistic regression for an analysis of binary response variables and ordered probit regression for the analysis of categorical actor responses with more than two answer categories. Finally, in an effort to study patterns of collaboration among the various actors that participated in the Convention process, focusing on Article 3 of the draft Constitution (which lays out the overall goals of the EU), we present some results derived on the basis of electronic document analysis.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of recent work on possible division lines among actors regarding the process of European integration. It continues with an overview of the structure and operation of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the various participants in this process. Section III of the paper provides a short description of techniques we use to analyze preference divisions regarding the European Constitution and our procedure to assess patterns of collaboration among Convention participants with regards to the formulation of major EU objectives (as defined in Article 3 of the draft Constitution). Section IV presents the results of our empirical analyses. The final section of the paper (V) provides an evaluation of our findings and illustrates their potential merits regarding discussions on cleavage lines across Europe.

2 Actor Cleavages and European Integration

As mentioned above, recent referendum outcomes, notably in France and the Netherlands, suggest that dissatisfaction with the current path of EU integration and the adoption of the new construct of the European Constitution may be particularly widespread in the EU's founding states. French voters declined ratification of the Constitution on May 29, 2005 by a margin of 54.7 against 45.3 percent. In the Netherlands, in a referendum on June 1, 2005, 61.6 percent of the electorate voted against ratification with only 38.4 percent in favor of it. Could this suggest that dissatisfaction with the current path of EU integration is most pronounced in the EU's older member states? Hug (2002: 85) finds that EU states that joined in the latest round of enlargement (at the time being those that entered in 1995) and members of the first round of enlargement (i.e. members as of 1973) may be among those least

supportive of EU integration. Hence, could there be differences in preferences on various aspects of the Constitution in a comparison between the EU's member states that joined in May 2004 and those that have been members for several decades? During the bargaining process on the Constitution, were such differences mirrored in the priorities of these states' delegates?

Relative preference homogeneity among EU member states of the same entry groups (i.e. those that joined in the same year) might be explained, for example, by a gradual process of socialization of these states into patterns of EU policy-making, "learning" the culture of negotiation within the EU, and the gradual development of similar expectations regarding EU integration. In a sense, this logic would follow elements of the constructivist research agenda (e.g. see Checkel and Moravcsik 2001), and accordingly, newer EU states could be expected to advocate similar interests in negotiations about future provisions for the EU.

Cleavages could also occur, however, on the basis of other policy dimensions. Recent literature, utilizing different methodological techniques, aims to assess the dimensionality of the "European political space" For example, Robert Thomson et al. (2004), analyzing a large-scale data collection on actor preferences in European decision-making between 1999 and 2002, found that European political space is multi-dimensional. According to this study, no clear cleavage lines can be discerned in EU decision-making, except for a moderate North-South division. This claim is reiterated by Thomson and Stokman (2006) in their contribution to the book *The European Union Decides*. Analyzing the same data set, the authors claim that if any structure exists in positions governments take regarding various issues of European integration, it is quite weak. The authors attribute this weak association to the sectoral nature of EU decision-making, whereby different interests are important depending on the specific topics being negotiated. Hence, if a specific division line exists in EU policy-making, it mostly appears to be a "North-South" cleavage. Similarly, in research focusing on decision-making in the Council of the EU, Elgström et al. (2001) find little evidence for cleavages in processes of coalition-formation and EU decision-making, apart from a North-South division. Based on an analysis of other data and using different methodological approaches, this finding is confirmed by the analysis of Zimmer et al. (2005).

Another kind of investigation into the dimensionality of the aforementioned political space is research based on party manifestos. For example, on the basis of content analysis of manifestos issued by European Parliament (EP) political groups, Paul Pennings (2002) finds that there are significant differences regarding policy preferences both within and between European party groups, generating meaningful political choices for voters. Also, on the basis of techniques used by the Party Manifestos Group Project, notably an analysis of positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat, and Liberal party leaders in the EP between 1976 and 1994, Simon Hix (1999) finds the prevalence of two major dimensions in EU politics: an integration-independence and a left-right dimension. This result reinforces claims made by Hix (1998) that the EU may be profitably analyzed on the basis of tools used in comparative politics, rendering both the left-right dimension and the integration-independence dimension salient to the study of EU politics. A model developed earlier by Simon Hix and Christopher Lord (1997) posits that in EU politics, a European integration and a left-right dimension exist which are largely independent of each other. The findings regarding a possible two-dimensional setup of EU policy-making are corroborated in

Gabel and Hix (2002). By comparison, a recent in-depth study of voting within the EP by Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland (2006), finds that in essence, within the EP, only the left-right policy dimension matters.

According to Arend Lijphart (1999), the left-right policy scale is a cleavage existing on the domestic level in a wide range of advanced industrialized countries. Based on expert interviews regarding positions of domestic political parties, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2001) identify a left-right dimension in EU politics ranging from social democracy to market liberalism and, in addition to this, a European integration dimension spanning the range from nationalism to supranationalism. According to these authors, however, some aspects of European integration are likely to be absorbed into the left-right dimension. Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Carole Wilson (2002) find that both a left-right and a libertarian-authoritarian dimension can be discerned in positions of national political parties regarding the EU, but that the latter is more prevalent. According to their analysis, in addition to the left-right dimension, a New Politics dimension structures EU politics, ranging from Green, Alternative and Libertarian (GAL) to Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist (TAN). Finally, according to Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), politics of European integration may largely be subsumed into the left-right policy dimension. By comparison, in an analysis of voting behavior within the Council of the EU exclusively, Mattila (2004) does not find left-right positioning to significantly affect voting outcomes.

In addition to this, Hooghe et al. (2002), as well as Marks et al. (2007), find that the relation between party support for European integration and left-right positioning is based on an “inverted U-curve”: more extreme parties on both the left and right ends of the policy scale tend to be least supportive of European integration. Similarly, Aspinwall (2002), in an analysis of party preferences for European integration, finds centrist positions correlating with support for integration, but extreme parties on the policy scale advocating less support.

Ken Benoit et al. (2005) assess preferences of actors on four relevant policy dimensions. Correlations between the preferences of domestic political parties as assessed by expert surveys and positions derived on the basis of semi-automated text analysis (from contributions by national representatives of political parties to the European Convention) demonstrate the potential of the “wordscoring” technique. In addition to three EU dimensions used in earlier work by Laver and Benoit – “accountability,” “authority,” and “security” – a left-right dimension is added to the analysis in this article. A fairly close correspondence is found between the earlier expert assessments and the wordscore technique applied to Convention documents, with correlations being particularly high, however, regarding the policy dimensions “accountability,” “authority,” and “security.”

Hence, various empirical investigations into possible cleavages in EU integration demonstrate that different policy dimensions may be salient in EU politics. However, in most work, the left-right policy dimension is found to constitute a major division line across the entire EU. This cleavage can be expected to be particularly prominent in policy areas in which aspects of socio-economic policy-making are directly at stake and may hence be assumed to structure competition of political actors within the European political space. In addition, the North-South division, an integration-independence dimension, or cleavages between older and newer EU states might be relevant.

However, economic and political challenges on EU states' domestic levels may have influenced the preferences actors voiced during the Convention. In order to control for such possible external influences on actor preferences, we will account for recent macroeconomic developments within the EU by including domestic rates of unemployment.²

Finally, it is possible that in the bargaining process on the European Constitution, interests of larger member states may have partially contradicted those of smaller ones. Such cleavages have been visible, for example, in negotiations regarding the total number of Commissioners for the EU, where several smaller states appear to have advocated maintenance of their national Commissioner seat. A similar division materialized in discussions on voting weights to be used in the Council of the EU.

In the negotiations on the European Constitution, actors have also formed teams in contributions concerning suggested amendments to the draft Constitution: an analysis of coalition patterns among actors regarding suggested amendments of draft treaty articles may provide interesting insights into coalition dynamics in the bargaining process on the Convention. Were actors mainly cooperating across national boundaries on the basis of political ideology and respective left-right cleavages? In a comparison between different EU entry groups, which member states cooperated most with other ones? Which political parties have collaborated most extensively across the EU? Subsequently, we will explore patterns of collaboration regarding an article of the Constitutional Treaty that focuses on the EU's overall objectives: Article 3 "The Policies and Functioning of the Union".³

During the Convention process, a wide range of different actors submitted a total of more than 6,000 documents. These documents were made available on the official Convention website.⁴ Submitted texts encompassed contributions by members of national parliaments, of the EP, government representatives, and supranational actors.⁵

The total number of Convention members was 105.⁶ In addition to this, each member – with the exception of the three chairmen – was allowed to appoint one alternate member. Adding the number of alternates to the total number of Convention participants brings the total membership to 204. Finally, several members were

² It is conceivable, for example, that the domestic rate of unemployment influences an actor's preferences regarding incorporation of a high level – or even of full – employment as a goal into the European Constitution (DOSEI question 5b).

³ The full text of Article 3 is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/c_310/c_31020041216en00550185.pdf.

⁴ The site is <http://european-convention.eu.int>.

⁵ For an exact breakdown of Convention participants e.g. see Kiljunen (2004) or Benoit et al. (2005).

⁶ In a breakdown of these Convention participants, representatives of national parliaments (30) and of the EP (16), as well as of national parliaments of the accession and candidate countries (two from each country, bringing the total of representatives to 26), constitute the single largest type of actor. Additionally, there were 15 representatives of governments (one from each member state) and 13 government representatives of the accession and candidate countries (one from each country). The European Commission was represented by two members. As observers, there were three representatives of the Economic and Social Committee, six representatives of the Committee of the Regions, three representatives of the social partners, and one person representing the European Ombudsman. E.g. see Benoit et al. (2005).

replaced during the course of the Convention. The total number of participants, at one point or another, was 267. An overview of Convention participants, their party family, and working group affiliation is provided in the appendix to this paper.

For the purpose of this manuscript, collaboration patterns regarding amendments to Article 3 of the Constitutional Treaty were assessed by downloading and analyzing documents from the Convention website.

3 Data on Actor Preferences and Analytical Techniques

The main data source for the subsequent analysis is information on preferences of EU member state governments during the negotiation process on the European Constitution. These data are derived from the DOSEI data set.⁷ More specifically, the basis for the subsequent analysis is the set of DOSEI questions related to socio-economic policy-making. Table 1 provides an overview of DOSEI questions in these domains and respective answer categories.

Table 1

The DOSEI project collected information on the “official government position” of EU states (including “accession countries” at the time) as well as preferences of various domestic actors, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Office, or, for some countries, parliament or major economic interest organizations. In the following analysis, information on preferences of different domestic actors will be partially used in order to provide more detailed information on specific issues negotiated in the Convention process. However, the quantitative analysis will resort to official government positions only. Although this results in small sample sizes, assessment for some of the independent variables – e.g. population size or government left-right positioning – are all on the aggregate level and generate comparable and consistent results for the analysis across twenty-five EU states.

As far as the statistical analysis is concerned, we will use multivariate techniques, but account for the fact that the dependent variable is categorical in nature.

Several variables in the DOSEI data set contain information on a pro-integration versus anti-integration dimension in the EU. This is true, for example, of questions asking whether an actor would like to have policy responsibilities in specific areas shifted to the EU level (notably DOSEI question 17), and whether an actor would prefer to have the Council of the EU act on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV) instead of unanimity (question 18) in given policy areas. Apart from the effect of independent variables such as “length of EU membership” or “population size,” it is interesting to see whether government positions on the left-right policy dimension explain variance on variables mirroring elements of the pro-integration versus anti-integration scale.

⁷ For further information on these data, e.g. see König (2005), Hug and Schulz (2005) or König, Finke and Daimer (2005).

The generic model we will apply in order to test for possible systematic effects on government preferences in the negotiation process on the European Constitution has the following basic form:

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ government left-right position} + \beta_2 \text{ length EU membership} + \beta_3 \text{ population size} + \beta_4 \text{ support for integration} + \beta_5 \text{ net budget position} + \beta_6 \text{ unemployment} + \varepsilon$$

“Government left-right position” is operationalized on the basis of information provided in Benoit and Laver (2006). Using expert surveys, the authors provide data on various dimensions, including the left-right location of political parties for forty-seven countries, on a scale ranging from 0 to 20. The higher the value on this scale, the more “rightist” is the party.⁸ In order to obtain data regarding the left-right location of EU governments, we weight the number of cabinet posts held by each domestic political party⁹ (for the time the DOSEI interviews were conducted) by the Benoit-Laver left-right scores and calculate appropriate values for the twenty-five EU member states as of 2004.

“Length of EU membership” is measured as the number of years in which a member state has belonged to the EU (or European Community, EC, before the EU started)¹⁰ and as an alternative to this, as a categorical variable with the following coding: founding members (1); members as of 1973 (2); members as of 1981 or 1986 (3); members as of 1995 (4) and members as of 2004 (5). “Population size” measures the size of an EU member state in terms of population (in million). “Net budget position” is based on calculations by the European Commission (European Commission 2004) on a member state’s budget position in the EU, here expressed as a percentage of its Gross National Income (GNI). Domestic support for European integration is measured on the basis of Eurobarometer public opinion data for 2003.¹¹ Data for the macroeconomic control variable unemployment are from the year 2003 (European Central Bank 2004).

Since our dependent variables derived from the DOSEI data set usually either have a limited number of answer categories or are just binary choices (where experts usually had the option to answer with either “yes” or “no”), we employ generalized linear models for which the response variables have a discrete rather than a continuous distribution. In the case of questions 5a, 5c, 18, 20, and 21 of the DOSEI data (see

⁸ All data can be downloaded from <http://www.politics.tcd.ie/ppmd/>.

⁹ We thank Simon Hug and Tobias Schulz for providing the relevant data on government composition and the number of ministerial posts held for the time span to which this analysis applies.

¹⁰ We thank Frank Schimmelfenning for suggesting to actually measure this variable on the interval scale, as the number of years of EU membership may influence the degree to which an EU member state is ‘socialized’ into the EU. The score for the members as of 2004 is negative (-1). For some parts of the analysis, notably where we expect that length of membership may not necessarily have a linearly increasing or decreasing effect on government preferences in specific subject areas, we nonetheless cluster states into EU entry groups and test this explanatory variable as categorical.

¹¹ We take the percentage of EU citizens that state they consider the EU to be a ‘good thing’ minus the percentage stating it was a ‘bad thing’.

table 1), the possible responses were binary.¹² Hence, multiple logistic regression models will be utilized for each case in which there either is a binary response, allowing for assessment of how the “proportion of successes” (response “1” instead of “0”) depends on multiple possible predictors, or in which there is a limited number of possible answer categories. The distribution of responses on such questions does not follow the pattern of the normal distribution. Instead, the analysis has to depart from the assumption of a binomial distribution. For the analysis of DOSEI questions 5b and 17, containing four ordered answer categories, we will use ordered probit.

Finally, we also aim to see whether actor cleavages, as hypothesized above, can be discerned when applying our main model to other data sets related to EU politics. One element of data collection to which we resort for this purpose is derived from a special Eurobarometer report published in March 2005, which analyzed variation across the EU in terms of knowledge of, and attitudes toward, the European draft Constitution. Particularly, we focus on an element of the survey that is especially indicative of citizens’ attitudes toward socio-economic policy-making (Eurobarometer 2005: 40): When respondents were asked in which policy area they would possibly employ a citizens’ right of initiative, when given this option once the Constitution was implemented, a range of interviewees chose the area of employment. Applying several elements of the generic model presented earlier, we will assess whether responses to this Eurobarometer question can be explained by specific actor cleavages. The technique to be applied is Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), as we aim to conduct multivariate analysis to distinguish between different EU entry groups. Unfortunately, questions regarding party identification are now rarely asked in Eurobarometer surveys (e.g. see Hug and Schulz 2005). Hence, it will not be possible to assess possible cleavage lines according to left-right self-placement information for these data. However, we will, instead of individual-level data, use data for the aggregate level of member states (by using the variable “left-right positioning” as assessed for governments).

Finally, in order to gain more insights into patterns of actor collaboration along party and EU state lines, we resort to a collection of data completely different in nature from the sources discussed above, derived by means of electronic tools: the full collection of texts submitted by various actors during the Convention process.¹³ Although several draft articles of the European Constitution, as negotiated during the Convention process, would be highly interesting to explore, we limit the focus here specifically to Article 3.

¹² Question 5a had three possible answer categories, but as only values 2 and 3 were chosen as responses in practice, the analysis will be based on binary logistic regression instead. We average responses given on the basis of two surveys conducted in the year 2003: Eurobarometer 59 and 60.

¹³ These documents also form the basis to the analysis by Benoit et al. (2005).

4 Preferences Regarding the European Constitution: Cleavages and Coalition-Formation

In order to discover possible cleavage lines among actors, we will subsequently apply the models presented above to the DOSEI questions related to socio-economic policy-making (see table 1).

Accordingly, analysis of DOSEI question 5a generates the following results: In the negotiations on the European Constitution, all governmental actors advocated inclusion of the overall goal of a "market economy" into the new Constitution. The sign for left-right positioning indicates that the more to the right governments were located on the left-right scale, the less they were inclined to support the option of a "social market economy." However, applying the model as outlined above, none of the explanatory variables turns out to have a significant effect on actor choices. As regards question 5b, whether and what kind of reference to employment should be inserted as an objective into the European Constitution, descriptive statistics reveal that "no reference" was chosen as an official position by only one government (Hungary). Twelve governments chose the option of a "high level" of employment, seven "full" employment, and five "full with qualified jobs." However, in an attempt to predict those patterns, ordered probit does not indicate significant influences of our independent variables. Nor does Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) regression of actor responses on "length of EU membership," clustering states by EU entry dates, show significant results. Nonetheless, a means plot, as given in figure 1, showing answer categories on the y-axis in a simplified interval-scale representation of actor responses, visually illustrates that references to "full" employment (or even "full with qualified jobs") were favored most by the 1981/86 entry group (Greece, Portugal and Spain), and supported least by the states that joined in 1973 (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom).

Figure 1

Analysis of question 5c, whether "competitiveness" should be inserted as an economic objective into the Constitution, reveals that left-right positioning is a potentially important explanatory variable, with governments more to the right being more inclined to favor a reference to "competitiveness." However, conclusive (statistically significant) answers based on the sample of twenty-five government positions cannot be provided.

Analysis of the aggregation of the five socio-economic sub-questions to question 17 (see table 1) generates some interesting insights. This question asked whether governments prefer to assign less powers to the EU in a given policy field, to leave things as they are (i.e. as set out in the Nice Treaty), or to assign more powers to the EU. Descriptive statistics reveal that concerning most of these issues (69.6 percent), governments preferred to stay with the existing distribution of powers between national governments and the EU. The attribution of fewer powers to the EU is preferred in only 2.4 percent of all cases; whereas a shift of more powers to the EU is favored in 28 percent of the total cases.

A more detailed exploration of information contained in the DOSEI expert data set shows that the governments of the Czech Republic, Germany and Sweden preferred

assignment of fewer powers to the EU within the domain of agriculture. By comparison, the governments of Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Malta and Slovakia preferred assignment of more powers to the EU in this area. As regards Structural and Cohesion policies during the negotiations on the European Constitution, no government officially advocated the attribution of fewer powers to the EU. It is interesting to note, however, that both the Swedish Prime Minister's Office and Downing Street preferred the attribution of fewer powers to the EU in this domain. However, the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Slovakia supported the contrary.

As regards economic policy, in which the EU currently holds rather few policy competencies, no government preferred the attribution of fewer powers to the EU. The governments of Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Slovenia preferred more integration, i.e. the attribution of more powers to the EU. No government officially favored the attribution of fewer powers to the EU in the domain of employment policy. Within the DOSEI data collection, the German Federal States (Bundesländer) were the only actors found to have officially advocated fewer powers for the EU regarding employment. The governments of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Sweden, however, preferred the allocation of more powers to the EU. Finally, regarding social policy, in which the EU again holds comparatively few policy competencies, no government officially advocated attribution of fewer powers to the EU, but the governments of Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden supported more integration.

Table 2 gives the results of an ordered probit used to explain preferences of government representatives vis-à-vis whether fewer or more powers should be attributed to the EU in socio-economic policy-making.

Table 2

Of the explanatory variables used to predict government preferences for more EU integration in socio-economic policy-making, only "population size" appears to have a significant effect. Comparing EU states' inclination to either opt for the assignment of less powers (response 1) or more powers (response 3) to the EU, smaller members are more inclined to support the allocation of more powers to the EU. In other words, holding the potential influence of all other independent variables constant, larger states were more concerned with the maintenance of policy competencies on the national level of EU states and favored less assignment of additional powers to the EU than smaller states did.

Question 18 of the DOSEI data set aimed to see which actors preferred either unanimous decision-making or the application of QMV in specific policy areas. A descriptive exploration of the data indicates that no actor for which preferences were assessed – whether a government delegation, foreign minister's office, or leading domestic political actor – preferred application of the unanimity rule for agricultural policy. Hence, concerning decision rules to be incorporated into the new European Constitution, QMV was preferred unanimously for decisions concerning agriculture. Regarding Structural and Cohesion policies, the picture is somewhat more mixed: The governments of the Netherlands and the UK, as well as some important

domestic actors within these states (e.g. the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Her Majesty's Treasury, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dutch Parliament), advocated application of the unanimity rule.

Regarding the application of the decision rule for issues concerning the EU's internal market, with just a few exceptions – the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Estonian Ministry of Finance – all actors for which data were available favored the QMV rule. Similarly, as regards monetary policy for the Euro states (question 18a.6) and economic policy (question 18a.7), most actors preferred application of the QMV rule. In Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Portugal, all relevant actors, including the government, preferred non-application of the QMV rule (i.e. maintenance of unanimity) for both areas. In Hungary, all domestic actors that the DOSEI data set provides information on preferred QMV for monetary policy, but unanimity to be applied in the domain of economic policy-making.

As regards the areas of employment policy and social policy (questions 18a.8 and 18a.9, respectively), opposition to the application of the QMV rule, across the range of domestic actors, materialized in Denmark and Estonia. With respect to social policy exclusively, all domestic actors in Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and finally, Slovakia were opposed to the application of QMV. Actors in other EU states opposing QMV in the domain of social policy include the Finnish Parliament, the German Bundesländer, Slovenia's Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of British Industrialists.

Application of ordered probit with the independent variables presented in the model above, in an attempt to explain systematic effects, shows that none of the independent variables significantly affects government preferences for the application of QMV instead of unanimity in areas related to EU socio-economic policy-making.

A last variable relevant to socio-economic policy-making in the DOSEI data set is actor responses to two questions concerning the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP): question 20 asks whether the SGP should be made more flexible and question 21 inquires whether the debt to GDP ratio should be incorporated as a criterion into the SGP. Results of the application of logit regressions for responses to these questions are shown in table 3. Regarding question 20, only the explanatory variable "length of EU membership" has a significant effect, with older EU states being less inclined to opt for answer category 2 ("yes", i.e. the response that the SGP should be made more flexible). By comparison, neither government left-right positioning, size, nor budget position had significant systematic effects on actor responses.

Table 3

Regarding question 21, whether the debt to GDP ratio should be incorporated into the SGP, the variable "length of EU membership" again generates some significant results: Older EU members were more inclined than newer ones to incorporate the debt to GDP ratio as an SGP criterion into the European Constitution. In the case of this DOSEI question, the analysis also reveals that the explanatory variable "unemployment" has a significant effect: States that experienced higher rates of

unemployment were more likely to have a government advocating inclusion of the debt/GDP ratio into the SGP in negotiations on the European Constitution.

Are the left-right and integration-independence dimensions related to each other? Some insights into this issue can be ascertained by measuring the strength with which government responses are linked on variables capturing these dimensions. Subsequently, sub-questions of variables 17 and 18 relating to socio-economic policy making will be correlated with data on left-right positioning. This analysis reveals that there indeed do not seem to be systematic links between actor left-right locations and preferences for either more integration or more independence in given subject areas related to socio-economic policy-making.

Finally, we analyze whether the general model presented above can help explain public opinion in the EU in a core area of socio-economic policy-making, applying it to the example of one question asked in a Eurobarometer survey published in March 2005. The question was worded as follows: "The draft European Constitution establishes that a million citizens in the European Union can demand the adoption of a European law. This is known as the "citizen's right of initiative." In which of the following fields would you like to use this right as a priority?" Interviewees could then choose a maximum of three responses from a list of topics containing about twelve items. Table 4 shows the results of a regression analyzing the percentage of respondents in each EU state choosing the option "employment," using predictor and control variables from the model as presented above.

Table 4

The results shown in table 4 demonstrate that unemployment rates in EU states significantly influence the share of respondents choosing "employment" as a priority area: the higher domestic rates of unemployment, the larger the percentage of citizens choosing this option. In addition, in a comparison with the reference category (new EU states), the percentage of citizens in the 1973 entry group (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) is significantly less in support of a citizens' right of initiative in the domain of employment.

The last part of the analysis aims to explore whether given cleavages can be found in patterns of coalition-formation during the Convention process. In order to discern patterns of collaboration regarding Article 3 of the draft Constitution, using electronic tools, we counted the number of times an actor submitted a document together with another actor. To facilitate this count, we created a 267 by 267 table and filled into the cells the counts of the number of times two respective actors collaborated. Of course, this implies that with this metric, our total number of collaborations will be larger than the total number of documents submitted. This is the case due to the fact that approximately 40 percent of all documents had at least one or more co-authors.

Subsequently, the results of this table were fed into the program NEATO, which draws layouts of undirected graphs. These graphs are created in an iterative process in which the final graph is the low energy configuration. Nodes with higher collaboration tend to be closer and to form a cluster. Nodes with a lower number of

collaborations tend to be spread apart and to fall at the periphery of the graph. The results of this analysis are shown in figures 2 through 4.

Figures 2 through 4

Figure 2 demonstrates the clustering of countries (governments) in terms of pair-wise collaborations. Countries that collaborated intensively cluster towards the center, while new member states, which tended to collaborate less, are found on the periphery. The set of countries that collaborated most in the Convention process regarding amendments to Article 3 include France, United Kingdom, and Italy, representing the big states, and Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands, and Romania representing smaller member states.

In figure 3, patterns of collaboration among actors are shown on the basis of their affiliation with party families (here visualized as affiliation with EP political groups). The picture shows that representatives in the category of the EP socialist group (PES) were most willing to work together with other actors across EU states regarding Article 3. It also reveals that the Green parties are closest to the PES in their collaboration. EPP, EDD, and ELDR form another cluster of party families that have worked together quite intensively. Similarly, figure 4 shows the clustering of collaborations between countries aggregated according to EU entry year. As this analysis shows, interaction was fairly evenly spread among EU states. Hence, this investigation of collaboration patterns demonstrates that cleavages according to year of EU membership occurred less than did clustering according to political party ties.

5 Conclusions

In negotiations on the European Constitution, it might be expected that usual conflict dimensions in EU politics determined the bargaining process, notably in domains related to socio-economic policy-making. Using information on government preferences, document analysis, and selected data on public opinion, this paper aims to reveal cleavages that materialized in the negotiation process on the European Constitution.

The exploration of empirical data indicates that the left-right policy dimension as assessed here does not seem to be a major crosscutting line regarding preferences of EU governments for issues encompassed by the European Constitution. Whereas the effects of party positioning often reveals expected signs, results of the analyses conducted here do not indicate significant effects. This implies that whereas the left-right policy dimensions might be a major cleavage significantly explaining, for example, vote choice within the EP, it does not yet seem to be a major dimension on which preferences of European governments regarding EU politics are aligned.

Divisions among member states according to the length of EU membership materialize regarding aspects such as the definition of the overall economic goals of the EU and preferred provisions for the SGP (notably inclusion of the debt to GDP ratio). A significant effect can also be discerned when comparing preferences by different EU entry groups for a citizens' right of initiative in the domain of employment. Accord-

ingly, it seems that theories hypothesizing that EU states gradually learn and socialize into structures of EU decision-making might partially explain some major cleavage lines in negotiations on the European Constitution.

Although one might expect that government preferences might be systematically determined by the degree to which domestic public opinion is in favor of EU integration, this analysis reveals that the link between government preferences (here in areas of socio-economic policy making as incorporated in the EU Constitution) and domestic pressures stemming from public opinion is not straightforward. In other words, public support for European integration did not constitute a major cleavage line among governments in negotiations on the European Constitution.

The analysis as conducted in this paper also shows a certain cleavage between larger and smaller EU states in the negotiation process on the EU Constitution: for example, smaller states favored the attribution of more powers to the EU than larger EU states did. But again, this dimension does not seem to be a systematic cross-cutting line.

None of the explanatory variables used in this study adds significantly to the explanation of government preferences for the use of either QMV or unanimity in the Council for policy areas related to socio-economic policy-making. Hence, the analysis could not systematically predict preferences for "more integration" by the choice of a range of independent variables.

Domestic unemployment rates in 2003, a control variable aiming to capture recent macroeconomic developments, clearly influenced government preferences regarding provisions for the SGP. It also incites support in public opinion for a citizens' right of initiative in the domain of employment. However, in other cases, the variable is not found to significantly affect actor preferences as voiced in the bargaining process on the European Constitution.

Accordingly, the results of this paper provide some empirical support for the assumption that there were no clearly defined and cohesive coalitions of member states in the negotiation process on the Constitutional Treaty. By contrast, different alignments of actors appear to have formed on different issues.¹⁴

Finally, while this analysis cannot find systematic cleavages according to either left-right positioning or preferences for increased integration, an empirical test based on government preferences indicates that the two dimensions may indeed be fairly independent of each other.

In terms of patterns of collaboration, our analysis reveals that members of the EP's PES (and domestic social-democratic parties more generally) were collaborating most with others in the process of submitting documents to the Convention. This pattern has been shown to hold in this paper regarding possible amendments to Article 3 of the Constitutional Treaty.


This paper operates on the basis of a small number of data points (one data entry for each of the twenty-five EU states as of 2004). In future research, it might be beneficial to see how more data points, e.g. for domestic actors, could potentially be

¹⁴ We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this aspect to us.

included into the analysis, while aiming to avoid biases created by the use of independent variables having identical values for several cases.

6 List of Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Means Plot Response to Question 5b (Employment) According to “Length of EU Membership”



Notes: Coding of EU Membership according to entry dates: 1=1958; 2=1973; 3=1981/86, 4=1995, 5=2004;

Coding of answer categories (reference to economic objective “employment”): 1=no reference; 2=high level; 3=full level, 4=full with qualified jobs.

Figure 2: Patterns of Governmental Collaboration, Suggested Amendments to Article 3 of the Constitutional Treaty




Figure 3: Patterns of Collaboration According to European Parliament Party Groups, Suggested Amendments to Article 3 of the Constitutional Treaty




Figure 4: Patterns of Collaboration According to Year of European Union Membership, Suggested Amendments to Article 3 of the Constitutional Treaty




Table 1: Overview of DOSEI Questions Related to Socio-Economic Policy-Making

DOSEI Question	Issue	Answer categories
<p><i>Question 5:</i> From the list of economic objectives below, please indicate what the [government / EP / Commission] prefers to be included in the final version of the Constitution. For objectives with subcategories please choose a specification. Are there any relevant actors of those you have mentioned that have a different position? (Or more specifically: What is the position of the [actor XY]?) (More than one answer possible).</p>		
5a	<i>Market economy</i>	1 no 2 free single 3 social
5b	<i>Employment</i>	1 no 2 high level 3 full 4 full with qualified jobs
5c	<i>Competitiveness</i>	1 no 2 yes
<p><i>Question 17:</i> Compared to the current situation (as defined in the treaties) in which policy areas does the [government / EP / Commission] prefer to have more, less or the same jurisdiction at the EU level? Are there any relevant actors of those you have mentioned that have a different position? (Or more specifically: What is the position of the [actor XY]?)</p>		
17.1	<i>Agriculture</i>	1 Assignment of less powers to the EU 2 Leave things as they are (as set out in the Nice Treaty) 3 Assignment of more powers to the EU
17.2	<i>Structural and cohesion policies</i>	1 Assignment of less powers to the EU 2 Leave things as they are (as set out in the Nice Treaty) 3 Assignment of more powers to the EU
17.5	<i>Economic policy</i>	1 Assignment of less powers to the EU 2 Leave things as they are (as set out in the Nice Treaty) 3 Assignment of more powers to the EU
17.7	<i>Employment Policy</i>	1 Assignment of less powers to the EU 2 Leave things as they are (as set out in the Nice Treaty) 3 Assignment of more powers to the EU
17.8	<i>Social Policy</i>	1 Assignment of less powers to the EU 2 Leave things as they are (as set out in the Nice Treaty) 3 Assignment of more powers to the EU

<p>Question 18a: What is the [government's/ EP's/ Commission's] position on the role of the Parliament and the voting rule in the Council in the following policy areas? Are there any relevant actors of those you have mentioned that have a different position? (Or more specifically: What is the position of the [actor XY]?)</p>		
18a.1	<i>Agriculture</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.2	<i>Structural and cohesion policies</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.4	<i>Internal market</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.6	<i>Monetary policy (for the Euro states)</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.7	<i>Economic policy</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.8	<i>Employment policy</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
18a.9	<i>Social policy</i>	1 no (unanimity) 2 yes (QMV)
<p>Question 20: Should the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) be made more flexible? Are there any relevant actors of those you have mentioned that have a different position? (Or more specifically: What is the position of the [actor XY]?)</p>		
20	<i>SGP more flexible</i>	1 no 2 yes
<p>Question 21: Should the debt/GDP ratio be incorporated as a criterion in the SGP? Are there any relevant actors of those you have mentioned that have a different position? (Or more specifically: What is the position of the [actor XY]?)</p>		
21	<i>Debt/GDP ratio in SGP</i>	1 yes 2 no

Table 2: Coefficients Predicting Government Preferences for Allocation of Fewer or More Powers to the EU (Question 17 DOSEI)

Explanatory and control variables	Question 17	
	Assignment of Powers to the EU	
	b	Probability
	(Std. err.)	
Government left-right position	-.018 (.040)	.662
Length of EU membership (in years)	.013 (.011)	.246
Net budget status	-.037 (.151)	.808
Support for European integration (domestic politics)	.011 (.008)	.174
Population size	-.020 (.008)	.010
Unemployment	.060 (.037)	.109
Cut-off score 1	-1.604	
Cut-off score 2	1.225	
-2 Log likelihood	-79.983	
Pseudo R square	0.084	
LR Chi-square (6)	14.58	
Prob > Chi2	0.024	
n	125	

Note: Coding is fewer powers to EU (1); leave things as they are (2); more powers to EU (3).

Table 3: Coefficients of Logit Regressions on Questions 20 and 21 of the DOSEI Data Set

Explanatory and control variables	Question 20		Question 21	
	"Should the SGP be made more flexible?" (1 no; 2 yes)		"Should the debt/GDP ratio be incorporated as a criterion in the SGP?" (1 = yes; 2 = no)	
	b (Std. err.)	Probability	b (Std. err.)	Probability
Government left-right position	-.066 (.171)	.700	-.477 (.365)	.192
Length of EU membership (in years)	-.130 (.066)	.048	.278 (.161)	.084
Net budget status	-.914 (.750)	.223	.116 (.929)	.901
Support for European integration (domestic politics)	.043 (.039)	.267	-.058 (.053)	.268
Population size	.041 (.037)	.265	-.173 (.109)	.113
Unemployment	-.186 (.186)	.317	.484 (.263)	.065
Constant	2.043 (2.479)	.410	4.504 (4.750)	.343
-2 Log likelihood	11.751		-9.219	
Pseudo R square	0.302		0.378	
LR Chi-square (6)	10.15		11.21	
Prob > Chi2	0.119		.082	
n	25		25	

Table 4: Coefficients Predicting Eurobarometer Response (ANCOVA)

Explanatory and (macroeconomic) control variables	Response right of initiative in area of employment
Government left-right position	-.560 (.589)
Length of EU membership:	
Founding members	7.310 (7.597)
Since 1973	-14.961 ** (6.582)
Since 1981/1986	7.212 (8.226)
Since 1995	-2.234 (7.690)
Since 2004	---
Net budget status	4.651 (3.267)
Support for European integration (domestic politics)	.031 (.147)
Population size	-.075 (.126)
Unemployment	1.207 ** (.540)
Constant	51.362 *** (11.135)
R ²	.748
Adj. R ²	.596
F	4.94
Prob > F	.003
N	25

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10

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8 Appendix

Overview of Convention Membership

FIRST NAME	SURNAME	MEMBER STATE	DELEGATION	DOMESTIC PARTY	FULL PARTY NAME	PARTY FAMILY	EP GROUP	WORKING GROUP
Poul	SCHLUTER	DK	Gov	KF	Conservative People's Party	6	EPP	Working Group 6 "Subsidiarity"
Anne	VAN LANCKER	B	EP	SPA	Socialist Party Different	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Lone	DYBKJAER	DK	EP	RV	Radical Left	4	ELDR	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Pervenche	BERÈS	F	EP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
M. Josef	CHABERT	B	CoR	CD&V	Christian Democratic and Flemish	6	EPP	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Manfred	DAMMEYER	D	CoR	SPD	German Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Patrick	DEWAELE	B	CoR	VLD	Flemish Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Claude	du GRANRUT	F	CoR	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement	6	EPP	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Claudio	MARTINI	I	CoR	DS	Left Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Ramon Luis	VALCARCEL SISO	E	CoR	PP	People's Party	6	EPP	Not in Working Group
Paul	HELMINGER	L	NP	PD	Democratic Party	4	ELDR	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Jacques	SANTER	L	Gov	PCS	Social Christian Party	5	EPP	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Nicolas	SCHMIT	L	Gov	Tech	Technocrat	N	NA	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Renée	WAGENER	L	NP	Greng	Greens	1	GREENS	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Gaston	GIBERYEN	L	NP	ADR	Action for Democracy	1	EPP	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Ben	FAYOT	L	NP	POSL	Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Caspar	EINEM	A	NP	SPÖ	Austrian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Maria	BERGER	A	EP	SPÖ	Austrian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Jürgen	MEYER	D	NP	SPD	German Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Evelin	LICHTENBERGER	A	NP	ÖGr	Greens	1	GREENS	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Kimmo	KILJUNEN	FIN	NP	SDP	Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Adrian	SEVERIN	RO	NP	PSD	Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Robert	MAGLENNAN	GB	NP	LibDem	Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Vytis	ANDRIUKAITIS	LT	NP	LSDP	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Jacques	FLOCH	F	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Jozef	OLEKSY	PL	NP	SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Genowefa	GRABOWSKA	PL	NP	SLD	Democratic Left Alliance	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"

Gintautas	SIVICKAS	LT	NP	NS	New Union - Social Liberals	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
René	van der LINDEN	NL	NP	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	5	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Frans	TIMMERMANS	NL	NP	PvdA	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Jan Jacob	VAN DIJK	NL	NP	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	5	EPP	Not in Working Group
Wim	VAN EEKELLEN	NL	NP	VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	4	ELDR	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Alberto	COSTA	P	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Guilherme	d'OLIVEIRA MARTINS	P	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Proinsias	DE ROSSA	IRL	NP	Lab	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Reinhard	BÖSCH	A	NP	FPÖ	Austrian Freedom Party	4	NA	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Eugen	KRISTENSEN	DK	NP	S	Social Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Henrik Dam	BORRELL	E	NP	PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Josep	FONTELLES							
Sören	LEKBERG	S	NP	SAP	Social Democratic Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Göran	LENNMARKER	S	NP	Mod	Moderate Conservative Party	6	EPP	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Algirdas	GRICIUS	LT	NP	NS	New Union - Social Liberals	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Hubert	HAENEL	F	NP	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement	6	EPP	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Helle	THORNING-SCHMIDT	DK	EP	S	Social Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Olivier	DUHAMEL	F	EP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
John	TOMLINSON	GB	NP	Lab	Labour Party		PES	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Neil	MacCORMICK	GB	EP	SNP	Scottish National Party	1	GREENS	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Jens-Peter	BONDE	DK	EP	JB	June Movement		EDD	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Liene	LIEPINA	LV	NP	JL	New Era	5	EPP	Not in Working Group
John	CUSHNAHAN	IRL	EP	FG	Fine Gael	5	EPP	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Linda	McAVAN	GB	EP	Lab	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Hanja	MAIJ-WEGGEN	NL	EP	CDA	Christian Democratic Appeal	5	EPP	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Guntars	KRATS	LV	NP	TB/LNKK	Alliance Fatherland and Freedom	7	UEN	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Elena Ornella	PACIOTTI	I	EP	DS	Left Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Cristiana	MUSCARDINI	I	EP	AN	National Alliance	7	UEN	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Louis	MICHEL	B	Gov	MR	Reform Movement	4	ELDR	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Elio	DI RUPO	B	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Pierre	CHEVALIER	B	Gov	VLD	Flemish Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Marie	NAGY	B	NP	Ecolo	Ecolo	1	GREENS	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"

Michel	BARNIER	F	CEC	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement							Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS", Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
António	VITORINO	P	CEC	PS	Socialist Party							Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
David	O'SULLIVAN	IRL	CEC	tech	Technocrat							Not in Working Group
Paolo	PONZANO	I	CEC	tech	Technocrat							Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY", Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Sylvia-Yvonne	KAUFMANN	D	EP	PDS	Party for Democratic Socialism			2				Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Danuta	HÜBNER	PL	Gov	SLD	Democratic Left Alliance			3				Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Dominique	de VILLEPIN	F	Gov	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement			6				Not in Working Group
Göke	FRERICHS	D	ESC	employers	Employers							Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Georges	JACOBS	B	ESP	UNICE	Employers							Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Piia-Noora	KAUPPI	FIN	EP	KOK	National Rally			6				Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Erwin	STOCKTON	GB	EP	Cons	Conservative Party			6				Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Erwin	TEUFEL	D	NP	CDU	Christian Democratic Union			5				Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Joachim	WUERMEILING	D	EP	CSU	Christian Social Union			5				Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Gijs	De VRIES	NL	Gov	VVD	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy			4				Not in Working Group
Antti	PELTOMÄKI	FIN	Gov	KOK	National Rally			6				Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Elmar	BROK	D	EP	CDU	Christian Democratic Union			5				Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Alain	LAMASSOURE	F	EP	UDF	Union for French Democracy			6				Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Antonio	TAJANI	I	EP	FI	Come on Italy			6				Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Teresa	ALMEIDA	P	EP	PSD	Social Democratic Party			3				Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Teresa	GARRETT											
Panayiotis	DEMETRIOU	CYP	NP	DISI	Democratic Rally			4				Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
František	KROUPA	CZ	NP	KDU-CSL	Christian and Democratic Union			5				Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Peter	ALTMAYER	D	NP	CDU	Christian Democratic Union			5				Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Jari	VILEN	FIN	NP	KOK	National Rally			6				Not in Working Group
József	SZÁJER	M	NP	Fidesz	Fidesz			4				Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Jan	FIGEL	SK	NP	KDH	Christian Democratic Movement			5				Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Zakeriya	AKCAM	TU	NP	AKP	Justice and Development Party			6				Not in Working Group
Tunne	KELAM	EE	NP	PPU	Fatherland Union			5				Not in Working Group
Mihael	BREJC	SL	NP	SDS	Social Democratic Party of Slovenia			3				Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Emilio	GABAGLIO	I	ESP	ETUC	Unions							Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Andrew	DUFF	GB	EP	LibDem	Liberal Democrats			4				Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Nicholas												
Lamberto	DINI	I	NP	Marg	Daisy			4				Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"

Rein	LANG	EE	NP	ER	Estonian Reform Party	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Henning	CHRISTOPHERSEN	DK	Gov	V	Left	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
João	CARDONA	P	ESP	CEEP	Public Sector		NA	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
	CRAVINHO							
Teija	TIILIKAINEN	FIN	Gov	SDP	Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Hannu	TAKKULA	FIN	NP	KESK	Centre Party	8	EPP	Not in Working Group
Esko	HELLE	FIN	NP	VAS	Left Alliance	2	GUE	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Dimitrij	RUPEL	SL	Gov	LDS	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Janez	LENAR	SL	Gov	tech	Technocrat	N	NA	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Joschka	FISCHER	D	Gov	Gr	Greens	1	GREENS	Not in Working Group
Lena	HJELM-WALLÉN	S	Gov	SAP	Social Democratic Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Sven-Olof	PETERSSON	S	Gov	tech	Technocrat	N	NA	Not in Working Group
Ernáni	LOPES	P	Gov	PSD	Social Democratic Party	3	EPP	Not in Working Group
Manuel Lobo	ANTUNES	P	Gov	tech	Technocrat	N	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Ana	PALACIO	E	Gov	PP	People's Party	6	EPP	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Jan	KOHOUT	CZ	Gov	CSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party	3	PES	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Thom	de BRUIJN	NL	Gov	tech	Technocrat	N	NA	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Henrik	HOLEI	EE	Gov	M	Moderates	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Peter	HAIN	GB	Gov	Lab	Labour Party	3	PES	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Hannes	FARNLEITNER	A	Gov	ÖVP	Austrian People's Party	5	EPP	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Luís	QUEIRÓ	P	EP	PP	People's Party	3	UEN	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Euarda	AZEVEDO	P	NP	PSD	Social Democratic Party	3	EPP	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
António	NAZARÉ PEREIRA	P	NP	PSD	Social Democratic Party	3	EPP	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Valdo	SPINI	I	NP	DS	Left Democrats	3	PES	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Peter	SKAARUP	DK	NP	DF	Danish People's Party	7	UEN	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Edmund	WITTBRODT	PL	NP	SB	Senate Bloc	5	EPP	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
István	SZENT-IVÁNYI	M	NP	SZDS	Alliance of Free Democrats		ELDR	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Pierre	LEQUILLER	F	NP	UMP	Union for a Popular Movement	6	EPP	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Meglèna	KUNÉVA	BG	Gov	NDST	National Movement Simeon the Second	N	NA	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Jelko	KACIN	SL	NP	LDS	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	4	ELDR	Not in Working Group
Franc	HORVAT	SL	NP	ZLDS	United List of Social Democrats	3	PES	Not in Working Group
Kenneth	KVIST	S	NP	VP	Left Party	2	GUE	Working Group 3 "LEGAL PERSONALITY"
Marietta	GIANNAKOU-	GR	NP	ND	New Democracy	5	EPP	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
	KOUTSIKOU							
Anne-Marie	SIGMUND	A	ESC	employers	Self-Employed		NA	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"

Dick	ROCHE	IRL	Gov	FF	Fianna Fail	6	UEN	Working Group 1 "SUBSIDIARITY"
Androula	VASSILIOU	CYP	NP	EDI	United Democrats		ELDR	Working Group 5 "COMPLEMENTARY COMPETENCE"
Robert	BADINTER	F	NP	PS	Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Jacob	SÖDERMAN	Omb	Omb	SDP	Social Democratic Party		PES	Not in Working Group
Karel	DE GUCHT	B	NP	VLD	Flemish Liberal Democrats	4	ELDR	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Josef	ZIELENIEC	CZ	NP	IND	Independent		NA	Working Group 6 "ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE"
Diego	LÓPEZ GARRIDO	E	NP	PSOE	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	3	PES	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"
Pál	VASTAGH	M	NP	MSZP	Hungarian Socialist Party	3	PES	Working Group 4 "NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS"
Péter	ECKSTEIN-KOVACS	RO	NP	UDMR	Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania	6	EPP	Working Group 2 "CHARTER"